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THE CONCEPT OF CORRUPTION IN 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW 
Thomas F. Burke* 
In Buckley vs. Valeo,t the Supreme Court put the concept of 
corruption at the center of campaign finance law. The Court 
held that only society's interest in preventing "corruption and the 
appearance of corruption" outweighed the limits on free expres-
sion created by restrictions on campaign contributions and ex-
penditures. Other goals, such as equalizing the influence of 
citizens over elections, limiting the influence of money in 
electoral politics, or creating more competitive elections, were 
rejected as insufficiently compelling to justify regulating political 
speech.2 The Court's focus on corruption has been reiterated in 
a series of cases following Buckley, which have decided whether 
various provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act, or lo-
cal laws, violate the First Amendment.J Barring a major shift in 
this area of law, corruption is the criterion by which the constitu-
tionality of further reforms in campaign finance regulation will 
be measured. 
The Court's emphasis on "corruption and the appearance of 
corruption" has stimulated criticism on several fronts. From the 
left, the Court is criticized for not giving credence to other inter-
ests served by campaign finance regulation.4 From the right 
comes the criticism that the Court has been inconsistent in its 
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application of the corruption standard.s Others find the problem 
in the term "corruption" itself. Frank Sorauf argues that while 
the phrase "has a ring that most Americans will like ... its appar-
ent clarity is deceptive, and its origin is at best clouded."6 Yet 
whatever its flaws, politicians, activists, judges and even picky 
academics continually employ the concept of corruption in their 
claims about the campaign finance system. I hope in this article 
to give some sense of both the possibilities and the limits of un-
derstanding campaign finance as an issue of corruption. 
The first part of the article briefly considers the concept of 
corruption and the ways in which academic commentators have 
explored it. The second part analyzes how "corruption" has been 
employed in a series of Supreme Court cases beginning with 
Buckley. Finally, the third part defends what I call the "mone-
tary influence" standard of corruption as the most appropriate 
one to use in controversies over campaign finance. This defense 
turns out to be a rather complex enterprise; it requires a turn 
back to the foundations of representative democracy. Any ade-
quate standard of corruption, I argue, must be grounded in a 
convincing theory of representation. 
I. THE CONCEPT OF CORRUPTION 
Even the dictionary definitions of corruption suggest that it 
is a tricky term. The Oxford English Dictionary gives nine basic 
definitions of corruption, but there is an element common to all: 
a notion that something pure, or natural, or ordered has decayed 
or become degraded. Corruption was used in medieval times to 
denote physical processes such as infection or decomposition.? 
When corruption is proclaimed in political life it presumes some 
ideal state. Corruption is thus a loaded term: you cannot call 
something corrupt without an implicit reference to some ideal. 
In order to employ the concept of corruption in the context of a 
political controversy, such as that over campaign finance, one 
must have some underlying notion of the pure, original or natu-
ral state of the body politic. 
5. See Antonin Scalia's dissent in Austin, 494 U.S. at 679. 
6. Frank J. Sorauf, Caught in a Political Thicket: The Supreme Court and Campaign 
Finance, 3 Const. Cornrn. 97, 103 (1986). See also two wide-ranging critiques of the 
Court's corruption standard: Jonathan Bernstein, Goo Goo Terror, 95 Inst. of Govern-
mental Studies Working Paper 22, Institute of Governmental Studies, University of Cali-
fornia-Berkeley (1995); and Ron Schmidt, Jr., Defining Corruption: Plunkitt to Buckley 
and Beyond, 95 Institute of Governmental Studies Working Paper 21, Institute of Gov-
ernmental Studies, University of California-Berkeley (1995). 
7. J.A. Simpson and E.S.C. Weiner, eds., 3 The Oxford English Dictionary 972-74 
(Clarendon Press, 2d ed. 1989). 
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Not surprisingly, then, academics have had difficulty arriving 
at satisfactory criteria for deciding what is corrupt. James Scott 
divides attempts into three approaches: legal norms, public opin-
ion, and the public interests A legal norms approach focuses on 
the laws and formal rules of a given society in determining what 
is corrupt and what is not.9 While such an approach may be use-
ful in comparative research, it seems unlikely that it can help us 
in a discussion of a legal controversy.w After all, we can't very 
well refer to the rules of our society when the issue is what those 
rules should be. 
The public opinion approach is similarly problematic.u It 
may seem sensible to define what is corrupt by finding out what 
most people in a given society consider corrupt, but on most of 
the interesting questions public opinion is likely to be ambiguous. 
As Scott points out, there is no clear, non-arbitrary way to decide 
what level of social consensus is necessary before we declare a 
given act corrupt.lz Should a mere majority be sufficient, or 
should unanimity be required? Should the opinions of the more 
educated, those better informed, or those more interested in 
politics, be given more weight? Public opinion will always be an 
unsteady guide except in the easy cases. 
Finally there is the public interest approach, which involves 
defining some ideal against which corrupt conduct can be mea-
sured. This approach merely gauges what is corrupt in terms of 
an even more contested concept, the "public interest." Political 
scientists, who have given the most thought to the concept of cor-
8. See James C. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption 3-5 (Prentice Hall, Inc., 
1972). For a full discussion of the ways in which corruption has been defined in political 
science, see Arnold J. Heidenheimer, ed., Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative 
Analysis 3-8 (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1970). This book contains a vast number 
of essays and articles by comparative and American political scientists on corruption. 
One attempt to consolidate the various definitions into one coherent scheme is John G. 
Peters' and Susan Welch's, Political Corruption in America: A Search for Definitions and a 
Theory, or If Political Corruption Is in the Mainstream of American Politics Why Is It Not 
in the Mainstream of American Politics Research?, 72 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 974 (1978). 
9. This is the approach taken, for example, by Joseph Nye, who defines corruption 
as "behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-
regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates 
rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence." J.S. Nye, Cor-
ruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis in Heidenheimer, ed., Political 
Corruption 564, 566-67 (cited in note 8). 
10. This is a point Dan Lowenstein makes in his article Political Bribery and the 
Intermediate Theory of Politics, 32 UCLA L. Rev. 784 (1985). Lowenstein discusses the 
problem of defining corruption at 798-804. 
11. Heidenheimer takes a modified public opinion approach; he considers the opin-
ions of both public officials and mass public opinion. See Heidenheimer, ed., Political 
Corruption at 3-28 (cited in note 8). 
12. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption at 4 (cited in note 8). 
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ruption, have had trouble even agreeing that there is some such 
thing as the public interest, much less defining what that interest 
involves.13 Thus all three approaches have serious problems. 
Fortunately, for the purposes of this article I need not pre-
tend that there is some unifying, global criterion of corruption. 
Rather, my task is to give some sense to the term as it is used in 
the discussion of campaign finance law. Yet even in this more 
limited realm it is hard to see where we are to draw our standards 
from. 
II. CORRUPTION AND THE CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE CASES 
Buckley and its progeny are complex, confusing cases. At 
times even passages in a single opinion seem to contradict each 
other. Thus it is no surprise that commentators have differed in 
their interpretation of the Court's treatment of corruption. Lil-
lian BeVier, writing in 1985, concludes that under the Court's rul-
ings the "only activity that may become the target of corruption-
preventing legislation is that of securing or attempting to secure 
'political quid pro quos from current and potential officehold-
ers. "'14 By this criterion, only pre-arranged deals-trades of 
votes for money-qualify legally as corrupt. Paul Edwards fur-
ther develops the quid pro quo standard of corruption and claims 
that with Austin the Court made a "dramatic change" in its ap-
proach by veering away from this limited definition of corruption 
to a much broader one, influenced perhaps by Rawlsian liber-
alism.ls Frank Sorauf, by contrast, finds hints even in the earlier 
13. Frank Sorauf reviewed this debate in The Public Interest Reconsidered, 19 J. of 
Politics 616 (1957). Sorauf criticizes the term as "subjective and imprecise" and calls vari-
ous definitions of it "illogical." ld. at 633. Sorauf argues that outcomes of public poli-
cymaking cannot be judged by a public interest standard. Nevertheless, Sorauf says there 
is a public interest in the process by which policies are created. Thus Sorauf identifies the 
public interest with the "process of group accommodation." Id. at 638. This leaves some 
ground for pluralists like Sorauf to use a public interest concept in evaluating campaign 
finance procedures. Robert Dahl similarly finds the "common good" in "practices, ar-
rangements, institutions, and processes that ... promote the well-being of ourselves and 
others .... " Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics 307 (Yale U. Press, 1989). Like 
Sorauf, Dahl's discussion of practices that promote the common good suggests that Dahl 
could employ a public interest concept in evaluating issues of campaign finance. 
14. Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and 
Campaign Finance Reform, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1045, 1082 (1985). BeVier is quoting from 
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26. 
15. Paul S. Edwards, Defining Political Corruption: The Supreme Court's Role, 10 
BYU J. Pub. L. 1, 3 (1996). 
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cases that the Court's concerns went beyond pure quid pro 
quos.16 
While quid pro quo is no doubt a major theme in the cam-
paign finance cases, I think Sorauf is right to suggest that the 
Court went well beyond this standard even before Austin. In the 
series of cases beginning with Buckley and ending with Austin, 
three distinct standards of corruption that are advanced, though 
at several points the Court blurs them. I label them quid pro 
quo, monetary influence, and distortion. 
The quid pro quo standard is simply that it is corrupt for an 
officeholder to take money in exchange for some action. The 
money may be a bribe for personal use or a campaign contribu-
tion. The deal is explicit, with both sides acknowledging that a 
trade is being made. 
The monetary influence standard is broader. Here the root 
idea is that it is corrupt for officeholders to perform their public 
duties with monetary considerations in mind. The influence of 
money is corrupting under this standard even if no explicit deal is 
made. 
The third standard of corruption is distortion. The ideal be-
hind this standard is that the decisions of officeholders should 
closely reflect the views of the public. Campaign contributions 
are corrupting to the extent that they do not reflect the balance 
of public opinion and thus distort policymaking through their in-
fluence on elections. 
The three standards of corruption-quid pro quo, monetary 
influence and distortion-have been jumbled together in the 
corpus of campaign finance law. 
Quid Pro Quo Versus Monetary Influence 
In Buckley, the Court struck down limitations on campaign 
expenditures, but upheld contribution limits. Contributions, the 
Court said, were less speech-like than expenditures and thus de-
served lesser protection.17 But contributions are also more regu-
latable because they, unlike expenditures, can be a source of 
corruption by influencing the conduct of representatives. While 
the Court at first emphasizes the danger of quid pro quo in dis-
16. "But while the quid pro quo is the nub of the matter, it is perhaps not the total· 
ity of it." Sorauf, 3 Const. Comm. at 103 (cited in note 6). 
17. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 24-29. 
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cussing the problem of corruption,1s it also notes that the state's 
interest goes beyond mere bribery: "But laws making criminal 
the giving and taking of bribes deal with only the most blatant 
and specific attempts of those with money to influence govern-
mental action."19 This pattern is repeated in succeeding cases. 
The Court mentions the quid pro quo standard, but also suggests 
that corruption goes beyond pre-arranged trading of votes for 
contributions. Here the Court is hinting at the monetary influ-
ence standard. 
In National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,zo the Court struck 
down a Massachusetts law forbidding corporations and banks 
from spending money in referenda campaigns.21 The Court fol-
lowed Buckley in reasoning that while the First Amendment in-
terest in such independent expenditures is high, there is no threat 
of corruption because in referenda elections there is no candi-
date to corrupt. In a footnote the majority opinion distinguished 
the Massachusetts law from the longstanding Federal Corrupt 
Practices Act, which bars corporate spending in candidate 
elections: 
The overriding concern behind the enactment of statutes such 
as the Federal Corrupt Practices Act was the problem of cor-
ruption of elected representatives through the creation of 
political debts. The importance of the governmental interest 
in preventing this occurrence has never been doubted.22 
Here again the Court seems to go beyond the concern about quid 
pro quo vote-trading, this time to characterize corruption as "the 
creation of political debts." Four years later, in FEC v. National 
Right to Work Comm.,23 the Court again discussed the need to 
insure that corporate "war chests" not be used to create "polit-
ical debts."24 
For the most part in these early cases the Court does little to 
explain its notion of corruption, and we are left to read between 
the lines. But Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in the 1984 
18. "To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro 
quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representa-
tive democracy is undermined." I d. at 26. 
19. Id. at 27-28. 
20. 435 u.s. 765 (1978). 
21. Id. at 795. 
22. 435 U.S. at 788 n.26 (1978) (citation omitted). 
23. 459 u.s. 197 (1982). 
24. Id. at 207-11. 
1997] CORRUPTION 133 
case of FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Comm.zs 
offers a definition: 
Corruption is a subversion of the political process. 
Elected officials are influenced to act contrary to their obliga-
tions of office by the prospect of financial gain to themselves 
or infusions of money into their campaigns. The hallmark of 
corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for political 
favors.26 
Here a much wider standard of corruption appears with a re-
statement of the familiar quid pro quo as a "hallmark." Rehn-
quist says that elected officials violate their public trust when 
they are influenced by the "prospect of financial gain to them-
selves or infusions of money into their campaigns." If Rehnquist 
had wanted to limit the corruption interest to quid pro quos, he 
could simply have said so. Instead he calls quid pro quo vote-
trading merely the "hallmark" of political corruption. In this 
passage, the Court again seems to be acknowledging the mone-
tary influence standard of corruption. 
Despite this acknowledgment, a clearer passage in Rehn-
quist's opinion in NCPAC reverts to the narrow quid pro quo 
standard. Relying on Buckley in distinguishing the regulation of 
expenditures from the regulations of contributions, Rehnquist 
concludes that expenditures made independently by a political 
action committee to support a particular candidate pose little 
danger of corruption. Here he emphasizes that "the absence of 
prearrangement and coordination undermines the value of the 
expenditure to the candidate, and thereby alleviates the danger 
that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper 
commitments from the candidate."z7 Overall, then, in NCPAC 
the Court seems to be moving towards the more narrow quid pro 
quo standard. 
Distortion 
That movement is reversed in the 1986 case FEC v. Massa-
chusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.zs Justice Brennan, writing for the 
majority, held that a state law restricting independent expendi-
tures for candidate elections was overbroad as applied to the ap-
pellee, a non-profit corporation. Brennan argued that advocacy 
groups such as MCFLI should be distinguished from profit-seek-
25. 470 u.s. 480 (1985). 
26. Id. at 497. 
27. Id. at 498. 
28. 479 u.s. 238 (1986). 
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ing corporations, who pose a real danger of distorting the polit-
ical process through their accretion of wealth. Citing several 
earlier corporate cases, Brennan said the precedents reflected 
concern "about the potential for unfair deployment of wealth for 
political purposes." Non-profit corporations "do not pose that 
danger of corruption. "29 This is the only point in the opinion in 
which Brennan clarifies, even by implication, just what he means 
by corruption. Brennan's main argument is that corporate polit-
ical spending poses a threat to the "political marketplace" be-
cause the "resources in the treasury of a business corporation ... 
are not an indication of popular support for the corporation's 
political ideas. "3o Here Brennan embraces the distortion 
standard. 
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,31 decided in 
1990, amplifies this theme and links it more clearly to the concept 
of corruption. The case concerned an independent expenditure 
made by the Chamber of Commerce to promote a candidate for 
the U.S. House of Representatives. In Buckley, the Court had 
concluded that such independent expenditures posed a relatively 
small risk of corruption since candidates were far less likely to 
feel a debt to independent spenders than contributors. In up-
holding a law barring such independent expenditures, the Court 
could merely have taken issue with this assessment and declared 
that independent expenditures also create political debts.32 In-
stead, Justice Marshall's opinion defines a new concept of cor-
ruption, borrowed partly from Brennan's opinion in MCFLI: 
Regardless of whether [the] danger of "financial quid pro 
quo" corruption ... may be sufficient to justify a restriction on 
independent expenditures, Michigan's regulation aims at a dif-
ferent type of corruption in the political arena: the corrosive 
and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that 
are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that 
have little or no correlation to the public's support for the cor-
poration's political ideas.33 
29. ld. at 259. 
30. Id. at 258. 
31. 494 u.s. 652 (1990). 
32. This is what Justice Stevens, who wrote a concurring opinion, would do, at least 
for corporate contributions. See id. at 678-79 n.• (quoting First National Bank of Boston 
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788, n.26 (1978)). 
33. Austin, 494 U.S. at 659-60. In the latest Supreme Court campaign finance case, 
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996), Justice 
Breyer's plurality opinion steers clear of the distortion standard of corruption but does 
not clearly embrace either the quid pro quo or monetary influence standards. The case 
involved FECA limits on party expenditures in congressional elections. Breyer's opinion 
considers only the narrow question of whether independent, uncoordinated party expendi-
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Here corruption is no longer tied to the conduct of the office-
holder, but instead concerns the power of the corporate spender 
in the political marketplace. Although some of Marshall's argu-
ment was anticipated in MCFLI, the Austin opinion represents 
the flowering of the distortion conception of corruption. 
In a typically bombastic dissent Justice Scalia castigated the 
majority's "New Corruption": 
Under this mode of analysis, virtually anything the Court 
deems politically undesirable can be turned into political cor-
ruption-by simply describing its effects as politically "corro-
sive," which is close enough to "corruptive" to qualify .... 
The Court's opinion ultimately rests upon that proposition 
whose violation constitutes the "New Corruption": Expendi-
tures must "reflect actual public support for the political ideas 
espoused." This illiberal free-speech principle of "one man, 
one minute" was proposed and soundly rejected in Buck/ey.34 
In Buckley, the Court had rejected equalization as a legitimate 
goal for campaign finance law, concluding that "the concept that 
government may restrict the speech of some elements of our so-
ciety in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly 
foreign to the First Amendment."3s Scalia charged that the ma-
jority had simply resurrected the equalization theory in a new 
guise-the New Corruption. 
Evaluating The Standards 
Austin's distortion standard of corruption has broad implica-
tions. As noted above, to use the term "corruption" one must 
have some underlying notion of an ideal state. Marshall's opin-
ion suggests that in his ideal state expenditures are calibrated to 
actual public support. A deviation from this constitutes corrup-
tion and may be regulated. Because just about any private fi-
nancing scheme is likely to have "distortions"-to not reflect 
underlying public support-Marshall's principle would justify 
very strong regulatory measures.36 Indeed it is difficult to square 
Marshall's principle with any system of private financing for 
political campaigns. 
tures can be constitutionally limited. Following the logic of Buckley, Breyer argues that 
the lack of coordination between the candidate and the spender in an independent expen-
diture limits the danger of corruption. See Colorado Republican Federal Campaign 
Comm., 116 S. Ct. at 2317. 
34. Austin, 494 U.S. at 684. 
35. 424 U.S. at 48-49. 
36. It is important to remember that Marshall limits his principle to "the unique 
legal and economic characteristics of corporations." See Austin, 494 U.S. at 658-60. 
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Even those who might be attracted to Marshall's ideal, or 
think that corporations can constitutionally be kept from throw-
ing their monetary weight around, may shrink from describing 
this as a problem of corruption. "Corruption" can be used to 
describe any movement away from an ideal; this is the sense in 
which illness is a corruption of the body. But in politics "corrup-
tion" has typically had a more specific connotation: that an of-
ficeholder has been led by private inducements away from the 
ideal of disinterested public service. As Justice Scalia charges, 
the majority opinion in Austin takes advantage of this connota-
tion by confiating the relatively uncontroversial ideal of disinter-
ested public service with the far more problematic ideal of 
"undistorted" campaign finance. The rhetoric of corruption is 
used to champion an ideal so sweeping that, if taken literally, 
would condemn any imaginable private campaign finance sys-
tem-and perhaps even public financing systems in which the 
funding is not carefully calibrated to public support. 
But while Austin's standard of corruption is too broad, the 
quid pro quo standard is too narrow, as the Court has recognized 
from time to time. Indeed, if only pure vote-trading is consid-
ered corrupt, it is difficult to see how the Court could uphold any 
contribution limits. 
The quid pro quo conception focuses on pre-arrangement as 
the truly corrupting aspect of vote-trading. Under this standard, 
it does not matter whether contributions influence public offi-
cials' stands on public policy, so long as there is no formal deal 
made. But deals-trades of votes for money-were outlawed 
long before the advent of campaign finance regulation. As 
Daniel Lowenstein has pointed out, many courts have held that 
campaign contributions can be bribes, and bribery convictions 
based on campaign contributions have been upheld in many ju-
risdictions.37 Under traditional First Amendment doctrine, regu-
lations which impair free speech must be "narrowly tailored" to 
achieving a compelling state interest. If Congress could constitu-
tionally regulate only quid pro quo corruption, it is difficult to 
see why it would be allowed to go beyond simple bribery laws. 
Why regulate so much legitimate "speech" in an effort to stop 
bribery when you can instead simply outlaw bribery? Contribu-
37. Such convictions have become far more common recently; see Daniel H. Lowen-
stein, When Is a Campaign Contribution a Bribe?, Midwest Pol. Sci. Ass'n, Chicago, Illi-
nois, April1996. This article updates Lowenstein's earlier article on bribery law, Political 
Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of Politics, 32 UCLA L. Rev. 784 (1985). For a gen-
eral review of bribery and campaign finance law, see Daniel H. Lowenstein, Election 
Law: Cases and Materials (Carolina Academic Press, 1995). 
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tion limits are only distantly related to the goal of stopping quid 
pro quo vote-trading, and certainly would never meet the Court's 
"narrowly tailored" test.3& 
The truth is that the contribution limits the Court upheld in 
Buckley were aimed at far more than quid pro quo corruption. 
The Buckley Court recognized this when it concluded that "laws 
making criminal the giving and taking of bribes deal with only 
the most blatant and specific attempts of those with money to 
influence governmental action. "39 Instead the Court saw the 
problem as one of "political debts," that officials are "influenced 
to act contrary to their obligations of office by the prospect of ... 
infusions of money into their campaigns. "4o The problem recog-
nized here is one of generalized financial influence on legislators, 
not pure vote-trading.4t 
Indeed, it is not clear why a quid pro quo is any more cor-
rupting than a contribution which influences a public official 
more indirectly.4z In bribery law it makes sense to require that 
there be evidence that the official explicitly agreed to trade a 
vote for a contribution. Otherwise, we will never know for sure 
if she was influenced by the money; there will always be doubt 
about whether the gift was taken innocently.43 But the object of 
38. Indeed, Justice Thomas has recently made this argument. See Colorado Repub-
lican Federal Campaign Comm., 116 S. Ct. at 2328-29. 
39. 424 U.S. at 27-28. 
40. FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. at 497. See 
supra notes 25-27. 
41. Of course the contribution limits are partly justified on the other ground given in 
Buckley, the appearance of corruption. The Court has, however, not given much consid-
eration to this second interest, perhaps because it seems so open-ended: just about every-
thing that happens in Washington may appear corrupt to somebody. In practice the 
Court has often invoked the "appearance of corruption" standard, but has not given it 
any independent weight. 
Dennis Thompson makes a strong argument in favor of the appearance standard. 
Because "citizens cannot easily collect the evidence they need to judge the motives of 
politicians in particular circumstances," representatives "must avoid acting under condi-
tions that give rise to a reasonable belief of wrongdoing." Thompson says that when 
representatives fail this standard "they do not merely appear to do wrong, they do 
wrong." Dennis F. Thompson, Ethics in Congress: From Individual To Institutional Cor-
ruption 125-26 (The Brookings Institution, 1995). 
42. Thompson makes this point as well: "There is ... no good reason to believe that 
connections that are proximate and explicit are any more corrupt than connections that 
are indirect and implicit." Thompson, Ethics in Congress at 112 (cited in note 41). 
43. Even in bribery law it is not absolutely clear that a public official must agree to a 
quid pro quo to be convicted. In McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257,271-74 (1991), 
the Supreme Court reversed a bribery conviction because the jury had been instructed 
that no quid pro quo was necessary to make a campaign contribution illegal. The Court 
concluded that to allow a conviction without evidence of an explicit trade would cast a 
shadow over everyday politics and make all legislators vulnerable to prosecution. Id. A 
later decision, Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992), has thrown some confusion on 
this holding, however. Some courts have interpreted bribery Jaws as prohibiting gifts that 
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bribery laws is not the deal itself; the deal is just evidence that 
influence has taken place. The reason we make bribery illegal is 
that we don't want officials to be affected by monetary considera-
tions, not that we have a particular animus against deal-making. 
Even in bribery, then, the problem is not quid pro quo corrup-
tion, but the corruptive influence of money. Campaign finance 
laws can address this problem by creating a contribution system 
that limits the influence of money. Thus it makes no sense to say 
that the contribution limits are aimed only at quid pro quo 
corruption. 
At times Court opinions seem to realize this. At other times 
the Justices lapse back into quid pro quo language, perhaps be-
cause they realize the open-endedness of considering general fi-
nancial influence a problem. If the ideal is a system in which 
public officials are not influenced by campaign contributions, 
how broadly should campaign finance laws be allowed to sweep? 
One can imagine that, at the least, more extensive campaign reg-
ulation would be upheld under this standard.44 Nonetheless, the 
Court in its more thoughtful moments has employed the mone-
tary interest standard. When the prospect or the receipt of cam-
paign money influences the behavior of public officials, they are 
corrupted, whether or not a deal has been made. Although the 
goal of stopping this kind of corruption must be weighed against 
First Amendment interests, the Court has upheld contribution 
limits on this basis. 
III. DOES MONEY CORRUPT? 
I have argued that the Court is on firmest ground when it 
adopts the "monetary influence" standard of corruption. But 
what is it about monetary influence-or for that matter quid pro 
do not involve explicit quid pro quos. In United States v. Coyne, 4 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 1993), 
a county executive in New York State was convicted under the federal Hobbs Act for 
taking a $30,000 gift from a constituent. An appeals court concluded that the jury did not 
need evidence of an explicit quid pro quo as long as it concluded that Coyne "accepted 
the $30,000 knowing that it was payment related to his using his influence as County 
Executive on (the constituent's) behalf as specific opportunities arose." ld. at 111. This 
example involved a gift rather than a campaign contribution, and Lowenstein argues that 
courts may correctly choose to invoke the more explicit quid pro quo standard in cam-
paign finance cases. But in this, as in many other aspects of bribery statutes, the law is 
unclear. Lowenstein concludes that the lack of clarity and stability in bribery law reflects 
confusion over what exactly should be considered corrupt-the same problem the 
Supreme Court has had in the campaign finance cases. See Lowenstein, When Is a Cam-
paign Contribution a Bribe? (cited in note 37). 
44. For instance, the Court might, if it more straightforwardly embraced the "mone-
tary influence" conception of corruption, uphold a law regulating independent expendi-
tures in candidate elections. 
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quo trading-that is so corrupting? On what basis can we say 
that public officials who are influenced by contributions are cor-
rupt?4s Because the Court does not develop its own account of 
what makes an action corrupt, we must go beyond the campaign 
finance cases to answer these questions. 
Daniel Lowenstein argues that the "payment of money to 
bias the judgment or sway the loyalty of persons holding posi-
tions of public trust is a practice whose condemnation is deeply 
rooted in our most ancient heritage."46 Lowenstein believes that 
there is a strong cultural norm in our society that public officials 
not be influenced by money, in the form of either gifts or cam-
paign contributions. As evidence, Lowenstein cites both the 
45. A related question is whether campaign contributions actually do influence rep-
resentatives. The short answer, drawn from a growing body of evidence, is that contribu-
tions do influence representatives, but less than many suppose. Political scientists have 
produced a wealth of studies on this question but are only beginning to answer it. Most of 
the studies have attempted to measure the influence of PAC contributions on votes on the 
floor. While the results are mixed, most of the studies find only small effects. Contribu-
tions seem to go to representatives already inclined-by ideology or constituency-to 
support the contributor. But floor voting is only the tip of the iceberg of legislative 
activity. 
There is little investigation of how contributions influence behavior in committee. 
where most legislating (and deliberating) gets done. though one study found significant 
effects on legislators' level of activity on behalf of contributors. See Richard L. Hall and 
Frank W. Wayman, Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Con-
gressional Committees, 84 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 797 (1990). Similarly there is a paucity of 
research on how contributions influence representatives' willingness to meet with constit-
uents or intervene for them in administrative disputes (like the Keating affair). On the 
access issue, see Laura I. Langbein, Money and Access: Some Empirical Evidence, 48 J. of 
Politics 1052 (1986}. On floor voting, see Henry W. Chappell, Jr., Campaign Contribu-
tions and Voting on the Cargo Preference Bill: A Comparison of Simultaneous Models, 36 
Public Choice 301 (1981); Henry W. Chappell, Jr., Campaign Contributions and Congres-
sional Voting: A Simultaneous Pro bit- Tobit Model, 64 Rev. of Economics and Statistics 77-
83 (1982); Garey Durden and Jonathan Silberman, Determining Legislative Preferences on 
the Minimum Wage: An Economic Approach, 84 J. of Pol. Economy 317 (1976); Diana 
Evans, PAC Contributions and Roll-Cal/ Voting: Conditional Power in Allan J. Cigler and 
Burdett A. Loomis, eds., Interest Group Politics (Congressional Q., 2d ed. 1986); John P. 
Frendreis and Richard W. Waterman, PAC Contributions and Legislative Behavior: Senate 
Voting on Trucking Deregulation, 66 Soc. Sci. Q. 401 (1986); Janet M. Grenzke, PACs and 
the Congressional Supermarket: The Currency is Complex, 33 Am. J. of Pol. Sci. 1 (1989); 
James B. Kau and Paul H. Rubin, Congressmen, Constituents and Contributors: Determi-
nants of Roll Call Voting in the House of Representatives (Martinus Nijhoff, 1982); Jean 
Reith Schroedel, Campaign Contributions and Legislative Outcomes 39 Western Pol. Q. 
371 (1986); W.P. Welch, Campaign Contributions and Legislative Voting: Milk Money and 
Dairy Price Supports, 35 Western Pol. Q. 478 (1982); Allen Wilhite and John Theilmann, 
Labor PAC Contributions and Labor Legislation: A Simultaneous Logit Approach, 53 
Public Choice 267 (1987); John R. Wright, PACs, Contributions, and Roll Calls: An Orga-
nizational Perspective 79 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 400 (1985); John R. Wright, Contributions, 
Lobbying and Committee Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, 84 Am. Pol. Sci. 
Rev. 417 (1990). 
46. Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil is 
Deeply Rooted, 18 Hofstra L. Rev. 301, 302 (1989). 
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writings of various scholars on the subject, and the law of brib-
ery, which in many jurisdictions makes quid pro quo campaign 
contributions illegal.47 Thus Lowenstein appeals to the public 
opinion and legal norms approaches in defining financial influ-
ence as corruption. As noted earlier, these are problematic ap-
peals. Lowenstein has no polling data to show that the vast 
majority of Americans agree with his norm, but even if he did we 
might still contend that Americans are simply misguided in 
believing that financial influence is corrupting. Martin Shapiro 
argues that Lowenstein, by operating as a "cultural anthro-
pologist," might be able to discover a societal norm, but that such 
a norm cannot be the basis of constitutional law: "There is a cul-
tural norm of racism in our society. Does the existence of such a 
norm give constitutional legitimacy to racist statutes?"4B Shapiro 
maintains that Lowenstein cannot define what is corrupt merely 
by reference to social norms or legal principles. Even the fact 
that bribery statutes often cover campaign contributions traded 
for political favors is not determinative. Only a theoretical argu-
ment can answer the question. Everything else is question-
begging.49 
Thus any serious thinking about corruption must move us 
back to first principles, to fundamental beliefs about government. 
The debate over the place of corruption in campaign finance ulti-
mately turns on the theoretical foundations of representative 
democracy. 
In several recent articles Dennis Thompson has grounded 
his approach to legislative ethics in a theory of representation 
which stresses deliberation. The debate between Thompson and 
Bruce Cain, another expert on campaign finance, illustrates the 
deep roots of the controversy over corruption. 
Representation and Deliberation 
Thompson advances a seemingly simple notion: In a func-
tioning democracy, representatives must deliberate about the 
public good. Private interests have a legitimate place in a democ-
racy as long as they subject themselves to "the rigors of the dem-
ocratic process." To get their way, private interests must 
convincingly articulate public purposes.so 
47. See generally id. 
48. Martin Shapiro, Corruption, Freedom and Equality in Campaign Financing, 18 
Hofstra L. Rev. 385, 387 (1989). 
49. Id. at 387-94. 
50. Thompson, Ethics in Congress at 28 (cited in note 41). The only alternative is 
logrolling, but recent research suggests that logrolling is both more difficult and more rare 
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Private interests which attempt to bypass this deliberative 
process are "agents of corruption."sl They tempt representatives 
to ignore public purposes and to pay attention to influences "that 
are clearly irrelevant to any process of deliberation."s2 
What influences are clearly irrelevant? Thompson gives as 
his primary example personal gain. Personal gain tends to take 
time and attention away from what should be the job of the legis-
lator and can overwhelm the "unsteady inclination to pursue the 
public good."s3 Thus bribes, for example, corrupt the delibera-
tive process. 
Campaign contributions, Thompson says, are different from 
bribes because they are a necessary part of the political process. 
Moreover, Thompson says we should admire those who, within 
limits, pursue political gain, including campaign contributions.s4 
But campaign contributions corrupt deliberative democracy 
when they influence representatives to change their stands or to 
refocus their energies.ss Thus Thompson accepts what I have 
called the "monetary influence" standard of corruption. For him, 
campaign contributions that seek to influence elections are vital 
to the democratic process, but those that seek to influence the 
representatives' decisions corrupt the process. Thompson shows 
how a deliberative theory of representation leads to a "monetary 
influence" standard of corruption. 
In a recent article, however, Bruce Cain rejects both deliber-
ative theory and the monetary interest standard. Cain argues 
that deliberative theory is "excessively restrictive and very na-
ive," and that it is out of step with the philosophical foundations 
of American government.s6 Further, Cain suggests that Thomp-
than is commonly supposed. See Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organiza-
tion (U. of Michigan Press, 1991). Of 29 case studies of legislation considered in Congress 
between 1945 and 1970, Joseph Bessette found only four examples of logrolling. And 
even in those cases logrolling turned out to be only a small part of the story, with deliber-
ation on the merits also playing an important role. Bessette even argues that the case 
often held up as the paradigmatic instance of logrolling, the creation of the food stamp 
program, was more a matter of deliberation. Joseph M. Bessette, The Mild Voice of Rea-
son: Deliberative Democracy and American National Government 67-99 (U. of Chicago 
Press, 1994). 
51. Thompson, Ethics in Congress at 28 (cited in note 41). 
52. I d. at 20. Thompson calls this the independence principle. In his earlier writings 
Thompson calls it the principle of autonomy; see Political Ethics and Public Office 111-16 
(Harvard U. Press, 1987). The argument is also outlined in Dennis F. Thompson, Medi-
ated Corruption: The Case of the Keating Five, 87 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 369 (1993). 
53. Thompson, Ethics in Congress at 21 (cited in note 41). 
54. ld. at 66. 
55. Id. at 117. 
56. Bruce E. Cain, Moralism and Realism in Campaign Finance Reform, 1995 U. of 
Chi. Legal F. 111, 120. 
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son's approach relies on Edmund Burke's trustee notion of rep-
resentation, which, Cain claims, is not widely accepted. 
Instead Cain offers his own "procedural fairness" vision of 
democracy, drawn from the pluralist tradition in political science. 
He groups under this label theorists such as Joseph Schumpeter, 
Anthony Downs, Robert Dahl, and James Madison (or at least, 
Dahl's rendition of Madison). What these otherwise disparate 
theorists share, according to Cain, is an approach to politics that 
is nondeliberative. Each treats democracy as a matter of prefer-
ence aggregation, and each expects representatives to act as dele-
gates in order to be elected.s7 For proceduralists, Cain seems to 
conclude, the notion of corruption in campaign finance is simply 
meaningless. If, after all, politics is simply a matter of counting 
preferences, campaign contributions can be seen as a kind of 
vote, a way to signal the direction (and intensity) of one's desires. 
Money is then just another currency in the counting process, one 
which advantages some groups and disadvantages others. The 
only real issue in campaign finance, according to Cain, is how to 
Cain also claims that the deliberative theory "rests on the rationalist's faith that right 
reasons can be found for actions, and that political discourse will lead to the discovery of 
commonly acknowledged truth." ld. at 120. The first charge is true only in the modest 
sense that deliberative theory demands that representatives give reasons for their actions 
and that debate focus on the adequacy of those reasons (see the discussion of Cass Sun-
stein's "republic of reasons," supra note 56). As to the second charge, that deliberative 
theorists naively believe that debate will lead to consensus, nothing in deliberative theory 
necessitates this belief. If people are completely immune to persuasion, then of course 
deliberation is futile. But as long as debate is capable of moving people, then the fact of 
pluralism is quite compatible with deliberative theory. Hanna Pitkin eloquently expresses 
the deliberative view of democracy: 
Political life is not merely the making of arbitrary choices, nor merely the resul-
tant of bargaining between separate, private wants. It is always a combination of 
bargaining and compromise where there are irresolute and conflicting commit-
ments, and common deliberation about public policy, to which facts and rational 
arguments are relevant. 
Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation 212 (U. California Press, 
1967). 
Some versions of republican theory do seem incompatible with pluralism. But as 
Frank Michelman has argued, republican theory at its best depends on the diversity of 
views "that citizens bring to the debate of the commonwealth." Michelman seeks to re-
solve the tension between republicanism and pluralism in his article Law's Republic, 97 
Yale L.J. 1493, 1504 (1988). 
57. Cain, 1995 U. of Chi. Legal F. at 122 (cited in note 56). Strictly speaking, the 
proceduralist representative is not really a delegate but a "rational actor." She is not 
committed to the norm of following the views of her constituency but simply to saving her 
own skin-or, as the economists like to say, maximizing her utility-whatever that in-
volves. Normally one of the best ways to get reelected is to follow the opinion ?f m~e's 
constituency, so there is often a happy marriage between the delegate ro_le and ra~10n~ltty, 
but a divorce is always possible. In a system with uncontrolled camprugn contnbuttons, 
for example, it may be rational for a representative to dismiss the views of a majority of 
her district when they conflict with the desires of a generous contributor. 
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count fairly, and opinions about this will naturally differ depend-
ing on which groups one favors.ss 
The conflict between Thompson and Cain is so fundamental 
that it is difficult to arbitrate. Perhaps the best place to start is 
with Cain's contention that deliberative theory is a "nontradi-
tional conception of American democracy."s9 This is a surprising 
claim, for as Thompson argues, deliberation was at the center of 
the Framers' conception of representative government.6o The 
Federalist Papers, for example, justify many aspects of the Consti-
tution-separation of powers, bicameralism, methods of election, 
size of legislative bodies-in terms of their effect on the delibera-
tive process. The aim was to replace the excess of passion and 
"local spirit" that had overtaken state legislators with a concern 
for "the permanent and aggregate interests of the community," 
or as the Federalist Papers variously puts it, "the good of the 
whole," "the public weal," "great and national objects," "the 
great and aggregate interests," the "common interest," the "com-
mon good of the society," and the "comprehensive interests of 
[the] country."61 Indeed, Madison's famous defense of an ex-
tended republic in Federalist 10 was built on deliberative theory. 
He argued that such a republic was more likely than other sys-
tems of government 
to refine and enlarge the public views by passing them through 
the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may 
best discern the true interest of their country and whose patri-
otism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to 
temporary or partial considerations.62 
Madison was, of course, a subtle thinker who understood the 
complex interplay of interests and deliberation, so one is likely to 
oversimplify his views by selective quotation. Yet the delibera-
58. Cain argues that "By littering the intellectual landscape with irrelevant issues, 
moralist/idealists obstruct the path to a full, open discussion of the public's views about 
the proper distribution of power and influence." Cain, 1995 U. of Chi. Legal F. at 112 
(cited in note 56). 
59. Id. at 120. 
60. Thompson, Ethics in Congress at 19 (cited in note 41). 
61. This point is made by Joseph Bessette in Bessette, Mild Voice of Reason at 27 
(cited in note 50) (quoting the Federalist Papers). 
62. Federalist 10 (Madison) in Willmoore Kendall and George W. Carey, eds., The 
Federalist Papers, 77, 82 (Arlington House, 1966). Of course Madison was not so naive as 
to believe that representatives would always deliberate in the public interest, but he 
thought this ideal would be more closely approached in an extended republic, where fac-
tions would have a difficult time gaining control over the government. Daniel Lowen-
stein, in a review of Cain's paper, also makes the point that Madison was no 
"proceduralist." Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Campaign Contributions and Corruption: 
Comments on Strauss and Cain. 1995 U. Chi. Legal F. 163, 177. 
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tive aspects of his thought cannot be denied. Over the past three 
decades, scholars in law, history and political science have 
demonstrated the profound influence of republican theory, with 
its emphasis on deliberation about the public good, on the 
thought of the Framers, particularly Madison. The historian 
Gordon Wood concludes that Madison and the Federalists were 
far from "modern-day pluralists": 
They still clung to the republican ideal of an autonomous pub-
lic authority that was different from the many private interests 
of the society .... Nor did they see public policy or the com-
mon interest of the national government emerging naturally 
from the give-and-take of these clashing private interests .... 
Far, then, from the new national government being a mere in-
tegrator and harmonizer of the different special interests in 
the society, it would become a "disinterested and dispassion-
ate umpire in disputes between different passions and interest 
in the State."63 
The Framers, in sum, embraced deliberative theory. 
The elitism of the Framers, who envisioned rule by a virtu-
ous gentry, soon fell out of favor.64 But their concern for deliber-
ation has lived on. A long list of studies highlights the continuing 
importance of deliberation in American democratic theory and 
practice. As Philip Selznick writes in a recent review, "Delibera-
tive democracy is moving to the forefront of political theory."6s 
63. Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution 253 (Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1992) (quoting from a Jetter by Madison to Edmund Randolph, April 8, 1787, in 
the Papers of Madison, IX, 370, 384). 
Other historians who trace the influence of republicanism on the Framers include 
J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic 
Republican Tradition 506-52 (Princeton U. Press, 1975): Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological 
Origins of the American Revolution 22-54 (Belknap Press, 1967). 
Foremost among legal scholars who have embraced republicanism are Cass Sunstein 
and Frank Michelman. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Harvard U. Press. 
1993); and Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 Yale L.J. 1493 (1988). 
For a particularly forceful analysis of Madison's thinking by a political scientist, see 
James Q. Wilson, Interests and Deliberation in the American Republic, or, Why James 
Madison Would Never Have Received the James Madison Award, 23 Pol. Sci. and Politics 
4, 561 (1990}. 
64. Wood documents this process in The Radicalism of the American Revolution at 
255-305 (cited in note 63). 
65. Philip Selmick, Defining Democracy Up, 119 The Public Interest 106 (1995). 
There is much literature on deliberative democracy in political theory. For some exam-
ples see James S. Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic 
Reform (Yale U. Press, 1991}; Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in 
Alan Hamlin and Philip Pettit, eds., The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State 17 
(Basil Blackwell, 1989); John W. Kingdon, Politicians, Self-Interest, and Ideas in George 
E. Marcus and Russell L. Hanson, eds., Reconsidering the Democratic Public 73 (Penn-
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But attention to deliberation is hardly limited to theorists. Polit-
ical scientists have confirmed the central role of deliberation in 
American government in their study of legislatures, courts, bu-
reaucracies and the presidency. In his recent book on delibera-
tive theory and practice Joseph Bessette cites thirty-three such 
studies.66 
A few examples should suffice. Cass Sunstein argues, based 
on a review of the fundamentals of constitutional jurisprudence, 
that we live in a "republic of reasons." Courts, he says, will strike 
down laws based only on "naked preferences," the mere asser-
tion of private power. To act constitutionally, legislators must 
provide a public-regarding rationale for their policies. It is 
through the process of deliberation that these rationales are ar-
ticulated and judged.67 Martha Derthick and Paul Quirk trace 
the influence of ideas and deliberation on regulatory reform of 
the telecommunications, trucking and airline industries in The 
Politics of Deregulation.68 Richard F. Fenno finds that making 
"good public policy" through a careful study of issues is the dom-
inant goal of representatives who seek a position on the Educa-
tion and Labor and Foreign Affairs committees.69 As Joseph 
Bessette has suggested, when political scientists actually examine 
the process of policymaking they find plenty of deliberation go-
ing on.1o 
Deliberative theory is untraditional only among some plu-
ralist political scientists, who, beginning with Robert Dahl, have 
downplayed the republican and deliberative aspects of American 
government. The tradition from which Cain works starts not 
with Jefferson, Hamilton, or Madison, but rather with Arthur 
Bentley, David Truman, and Dahl.71 The vision of American de-
sylvania State U. Press, 1993); Amy Gutmann, The Disharmony of Democracy in John W. 
Chapman and Ian Shapiro, eds., Democratic Community: Nomos XXXV, 126-60 (New 
York U. Press, 1993); David Miller, Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice, 60 Pol. 
Stud. 54-67 (1992). 
66. Bessette, Mild Voice of Reason notes at 251-52 (cited in note 50). 
67. See Sunstein, Partial Constitution at 17-39 (cited in note 63). 
68. Martha Derthick and Paul J. Quirk, The Politics of Deregulation 147-206 (The 
Brookings Institution, 1985). 
69. Richard F. Fenno, Congressmen in Committees (Little, Brown and Co., 1973). 
Fenno's classic work on representation in practice is Home Style: House Members in Their 
Districts (HarperCollins, 1978). For an updating of this book see Jonathan Bernstein, 
Adrienne Bird Jamieson and Christine Trost, eds., Campaigning for Congress: Politicians 
at Home and in Washington (Institute of Governmental Studies Press, 1995). 
70. See Bessette, Mild Voice of Reason at 67-99 (cited in note 50). 
71. The most influential books in this tradition are Robert A. Dahl, A Preface To 
Democratic Theory (U. of Chicago Press, 1956); David B. Truman, The Governmental 
Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion, (Alfred A. Knopf, 2d ed. 1971); Arthur F. 
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mocracy as preference aggregationn is widespread among polit-
ical scientists and public choice theorists, but outside of these 
narrow realms it is hard to say how well it resonates. Whatever 
popular opinion would hold, though, Cain clearly underestimates 
the centrality of deliberative theory in American political 
thought and practice. 
Cain's argument that Thompson relies on a trustee theory of 
representation, however, points to a more troubling issue.73 In 
Bentley, The Process of Government: A Study of Social Pressures (U. of Chicago Press, 
1908). 
72. Cass Sunstein claims that what unifies pluralists is the notion that "laws should 
be understood not as a product of deliberation, but on the contrary as a kind of commod-
ity, subject to the usual forces of supply and demand." Sunstein, Partial Constitution at 24-
25 (cited in note 63). Similarly, Frank Michelman defines pluralism as "the deep mistrust 
of people's capacities to communicate persuasively to one another their diverse normative 
experiences . . . . Pluralism, that is, doubts or denies our ability to communicate such 
material in ways that move each other's views on disputed normative issues towards felt 
(not merely strategic) agreement without deception, coercion, or other manipulation." 
Michelman, 97 Yale L.J. at 1493, 1507 (cited in note 63). 
Whether this is characteristic of all pluralist thought is questionable. Nelson Polsby, 
who has done much to popularize the term "pluralism," maintains that pluralism is often 
caricatured by critics who argue against its most extravagant formulations. See Nelson W. 
Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory: A Funher Look at Problems of Evidence 
and Inference (Yale U. Press, 2d ed. 1980). Polsby contends that on the issue of delibera-
tion, pluralism is silent. (Polsby himself values deliberation, as is seen in his Conse-
quences of Party Reform (Oxford U. Press, 1983)). 
On this point, as on several others, there appears to be a plurality of pluralisms. 
Sunstein and Michelman seem to be particularly concerned with public choice approaches 
to politics, which can be seen as an outgrowth of pluralism but hardly encompass the sum 
of pluralist thought. In any case, Cain's approach-and the approach of the theorists he 
relies on, including Dahl-is to see politics as exclusively a matter of preference 
aggregation. 
73. Cain offers no evidence for his contention that the delegate model of representa-
tion is more widely accepted than the trustee model. I could locate only a few instances 
of polling on this question. In 1938, when respondents were asked, "Do you believe that 
a Congressman should ... vote on any question as the majority of his constituents desire, 
or vote according to his own judgment?" Thirty-seven percent chose the delegate side, 
54% the trustee side. (Roper Center Archives, accession number 0175920, survey spon-
sored by Fortune, August 1938.) A more recent survey asked: "When your Representa-
tive in Congress votes on an issue, which should be more important-the way voters in 
your district feel about that issue, or the Representative's own principles and judgment 
about what is best for the country?" Sixty-eight percent chose the delegate side, 24% the 
trustee side. (Roper Center Archives, accession number 0192631, survey sponsored by 
Time!CNN, February 10, 1993.) It is unclear whether this represents a time trend or a 
difference in question wording. 
The vast majority of Americans probably haven't devoted much time to thinking 
about the delegate/trustee issue. Those who have often reject the formulation of a strict 
dichotomy between the two modes. When members of Congress were asked a delegate/ 
trustee question, some rejected it as simplistic. "Who dreamed up these stupid ques-
tions?" asked one respondent. Thompson, Political Ethics and Public Office at 99 (cited 
in note 52). Moreover, John Kingdon finds that the delegate/trustee dichotomy fails to 
capture the complex ways in which members of Congress think about and perform their 
jobs. John W. Kingdon, Congressmen's Voting Decisions (U. Michigan Press, 3d ed. 
1989). 
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fact Thompson attempts to distinguish his approach from the 
trustee notion. He points out that the views of the constituency 
and the views of the representative about what is in the public 
interest are likely on many issues to coincide. Where they do 
conflict, however, Thompson says that representatives may voice 
their constituents' views in order to give them a hearing in the 
deliberative process. As long as the process itself is deliberative, 
as long as it focuses on the merits of the issue, it does not matter 
whether the individual representative is delegate or trustee.74 
And this suggests an important difference between trustee/dele-
gate theories of representation and deliberative theory: Where 
the trustee/delegate dichotomy focuses on the level of the indi-
vidual representative, the deliberative theory leads us to look at 
what is happening to the institution as a whole. 
Yet this refinement creates another difficulty, one that 
Thompson does not address. If in a deliberative democracy rep-
resentatives can in some circumstances act as delegates for their 
constituents, why can they not also act as delegates for their con-
tributors?7s I think the answer is that Thompson allows for only 
Hanna Pitkin concludes that the dichotomy, which she prefers to call the "mandate-
independence controversy," "poses a logically insoluble puzzle, asking us to choose be-
tween two elements that are both involved in the concept of representation." Pitkin, 
Concept of Representation at 165 (cited in note 56). As Pitkin, Thompson and others have 
suggested, we might be better off in discussions of representation if we dropped the no-
tion of a dichotomy between trustees and delegates entirely. 
74. Thompson is somewhat elusive on this point: 
[T]he ideal legislator in a representative system does not pursue the public inter-
est exclusively (whatever it may be). Such a legislator also has an ethical obliga-
tion to constituents that must be weighed against the obligation to a broader 
public. To find the balance between these obligations, even to decide whether 
they conflict, the legislator must consider the particular political circumstances 
at the time . . . . Ethical obligations of these kinds are contingent on what is 
going on in the legislative process as a whole and may differ for different mem-
bers and vary over time for all members. 
Ethics in Congress at 70-71 (cited in note 41). Elsewhere Thompson says that the 
deliberative principle "is consistent with conceptions of representation ranging from dele-
gate to trustee." The principle requires only that representatives defend their views on 
public policy "in a public forum-and at the risk of political defeat." I d. at 114. Similarly: 
[R]eelection or party loyalty could also count as principled reasons, when they 
are consistent with ... legislative deliberation. 
Thompson, Political Ethics and Public Office at 113-14. Thompson does not specify 
how far this goes. At some point, presumably, the forces of constituency pressure, reelec-
tion anxiety, or party loyalty overwhelm the process of deliberation. 
As these passages indicate, Thompson, like many other political theorists, is quite 
critical of the delegate/trustee dichotomy. See for example Thompson, Representatives in 
the Welfare State in Amy Gutmann, ed., Democracy and the Welfare State 131, 132-36 
(Princeton U. Press, 1988). 
75. This is the crux of David Strauss's argument against the deliberative approach to 
the concept of corruption. See David A. Strauss, What is the Goal of Campaign Finance 
Reform? 1995 U. of Chi. Legal F. 141. 
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a narrow exception to the basic rule that representatives must 
deliberate. In giving voice to the views of their constituents, rep-
resentatives can on some occasions move deliberation forward. 
But if a significant number of representatives are acting solely as 
delegates, ignoring not only the arguments of others but even 
their own views, deliberative democracy is imperiled.76 This cor-
ruption of the deliberative process is much more likely when rep-
resentatives fall under the sway of their contributors. 
Contributor-influenced representatives are unlikely to be candid 
about the motivation for their actions; the last thing they want is 
an open examination of the quality of their reasons and their 
process of deliberation. Thus where contributor-influenced rep-
resentatives predominate, legislative deliberation becomes a 
sham. By contrast, constituent-influenced legislators can ac-
knowledge the pressures on them and, where their own views 
conflict with those of the constituents, can even deliberate pub-
licly about how the two can be reconciled.?? Constituent influ-
ence can itself become a matter for deliberation in a way that 
contributor influence never can. Hence contributor influence is 
much more likely than constituent influence to have a pernicious 
effect on deliberative democracy. 
Deliberative theory, then, provides a grounding for the mon-
etary influence standard of corruption. If politics is nothing 
more than a market, and politicians nothing more than retailers, 
than there is no need for deliberation, and no necessary problem 
with "bribery" through the campaign finance process. That is the 
vision behind Cain's procedural theory. But if representation in-
volves deliberation about the public good, then contributions 
that influence representatives are a corruption of the democratic 
process. 
Deliberative theory is well-grounded in American political 
philosophy and practice. It is an attractive, approachable ideal. 
Its appeal explains why, despite criticisms like those voiced by 
Cain, academic, legal and popular debate about campaign fi-
nance continues to revolve around notions of corruption. 
76. Hanna Pitkin goes so far as to say that when representatives act as pure dele-
gates they are no longer doing something that can be called representation. See Pitkin, 
Concept of Representation at 210-211 (cited in note 56). 
77. This is a point that Lowenstein makes; see Lowenstein, 1995 U. Chi. Legal F. at 
191 (cited in note 62). 
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IV. THE UTILITY OF "CORRUPTION" 
I have argued that the concept of corruption can be applied 
to one of the major problems in campaign finance, the influence 
that contributors have on the actions of representatives. The 
monetary influence standard of corruption has been invoked in 
several Supreme Court cases, but the Court has drifted in its 
treatment of corruption. At some points the Court characterizes 
the issue as a matter of vote trading, of quid pro quos. At other 
times, the Court has portrayed the problem as one of "distor-
tion" of public opinion. Nonetheless, I believe the Court has 
been on firmest ground when it has recognized the issue as one 
of contributor influence. 
Of course this recognition would not by itself determine the 
constitutionality of any particular regulatory scheme. Indeed it is 
just one of the factors involved. People may balance the goal of 
preventing corruption and the First Amendment interests at 
stake differently even though they recognize the legitimacy of 
both claims. Still, by focusing on the meaning of corruption I 
hope I have given some sense of its place in this mix. 
Clearly corruption is a limited concept. It cannot encompass 
all the concerns we have about the campaign finance system. 78 
Because so much stress has been put on corruption in campaign 
finance law, there will always be a temptation to use it more 
broadly to cover goals that are only partly related-to stretch its 
meaning, as I believe the Court has done in Austin. Austin's 
proclamation that the political system is corrupted when cam-
paign contributions don't mirror public opinion cannot be main-
tained. "Corruption" will be drained of meaning if it becomes a 
mere synonym for "inequality." The concept of corruption has a 
worthy place in campaign finance law, and if the Court chooses 
to recognize other interests in campaign regulation it should not 
tarnish this one. 
78. Cain complains that Thompson's approach to corruption fails to address many of 
the key issues in campaign finance, particularly the inequalities created in the election 
system by disparities in campaign contributions. Cain, 1995 U. of Chi. Legal F. at 122 
(cited in note 56). But those who embrace corruption as an important concept in cam-
paign finance law need not limit themselves to this one principle. The American cam-
paign finance system is flawed in many respects, and no one principle can capture all of 
them. 
Indeed if Cain had merely argued that too much attention is given to issues of cor-
ruption in the popular debate over campaign finance and not enough to other concerns I 
would be in full agreement. 
